Abstract Since the 1990s, security as well as development experts have been accentuating the links and relations between security and development. The security-development nexus is a policy framework that combines the need for security with striving for development, and there are a variety of interpretations of the interdependence between the two concepts. The security-development nexus has also found its application in practice, and has led to profound changes in the military as well as development strategies and practice at the national as well as international level. There are an increasing number of projects and programs in which security and development are closely connected. Consequently, the agents and stakeholders in charge of security and development have to implement institutional, organizational and managerial changes, and the budgeting of security and development policy has to be transformed.

Keywords: • security • development • security-development nexus • development projects as security strategy • counterinsurgency
1 Introduction

As with many other countries, Canada is engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In particular, the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team is engaged in Kandahar province, where several projects are being carried out. One of the largest and most expensive of these was the reconstruction of the Dahla dam\(^1\) and irrigation system in the region. The project was organized and financed by the Canadian International Development Agency (hereafter, CIDA).\(^2\) The aim of the project was to improve the chances of the local population in sustainable agriculture by reducing their dependence on the vagaries of the weather. The dam was also intended to support many new jobs and decrease the frequency of blackouts, which in turn would increase economic activity. These efforts were also aimed at decreasing the number of people who grow opium poppies and cooperate with insurgents, who are often the only economic partners of local communities (GoC\(^3\) 2009).

After 2008, dam reconstruction work slowed down when the security situation in the region deteriorated. The number of insurgency-related attacks increased and several participants of the dam building project were killed. Even after the dam and irrigation system were finished and the irrigation system was finished, the situation in the region did not change very much. The Afghan company contracted by Canadian government and responsible for the security of the dam attacked in 2010 the CIDA’s employees, engineers as well as humanitarian workers. Consequently, the Canadian government decided to withdraw all CIDA’s people. The dam is currently being patrolled by international forces as well as Afghan soldiers, but the risk of terrorist attacks on the facility is high. The dam and the connected irrigation system represent a potential source of profit for the local population which could increase their economic independence, creating a “perfect target” for the Taliban (GoC\(^3\) 2009; Potter 2010).

To sum up and evaluate the case, the reconstruction of the dam was aimed at assisting the local population and making the lives of local people easier and more independent of the insurgency. During the reconstruction work the environment was so insecure that civilian workers had to be closely guarded by soldiers and by private security companies. Later, the opening of the dam and the commissioning of the irrigation system became the source of a new concern: that the dam could become the target of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, the destruction of the dam could cause a devastating flood in neighboring villages. The Dahla dam case clearly shows how closely development and security issues are connected. However, the idea that development and security, are interconnected, or even interdependent, is relatively new. It first emerged at the end of the 1980s in several reports (e.g. in the report of the Brandt Commission\(^4\) and in a report by a commission led by O. Palme\(^5\)). However, it was not until the middle of the 1990s that this was reflected in practical policies.
In the 1990s numerous humanitarian crises, genocides and civilian conflicts erupted and the international community was challenged with the question of how to effectively deal with such crises and assist the affected population. Operations in Haiti, in Somalia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda – to name just a few – opened up a debate about reconstruction and stabilization efforts and created the first experiences and lessons about the integration of security and development issues, and also about how to use armed forces in humanitarian reconstruction operations. Underdevelopment was accentuated as being one of the top sources of stress and unrest, and since the 1990s underdevelopment has been listed as among the threats to security (UNDP 1994). Awareness about the nexus of security and development was first raised within the UN (such as in the UN Secretary General report “An Agenda for Peace” and in the Human Development Report (1994) published by UNDP); later, it emerged in the policies of the main donors and on the agendas of international organizations (e.g., IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and the EU) (Hughes 2009; Lambach 2006; Picciotto 2010; World Bank 2011).

The re-formulation of the security-development nexus is still not complete. Since 9/11 more and more has been said about the need to continue implementing development projects even in insecure environments because underdeveloped and poor communities are prone to insecurity and to collaboration with terrorists and insurgents who are often the only “employers” in an area. The reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, and particularly the conception of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, has confirmed that the security-development nexus is a reality. The struggle for justice, prosperity and security has started to be understood as one activity, and the separation of development from security has become less likely after experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq (Picciotto 2010). As a consequence, development has become a security strategy. Development projects are used in insecure areas to win the hearts and minds of local population and have become an integral part of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activity (USJFC 2010).

As demonstrated, the security-development nexus has been on the international agenda for more than two decades, but the topic is still not well analysed and understood. This fact is demonstrated well by the meeting of a World Bank expert panel in April 2018. The panel was designed “to improve the understanding of the relationship between security and development and enhance collaboration across the humanitarian, development, peace and security sectors” (World Bank 2018).

Considerations and reflections about the security-development nexus include a variety of ideas, concepts, approaches and interpretations that have very different practical implications. The present paper has three parts. The first part offers a state-of-the-art review of the literature on the security-development nexus, while the second part pays attention to the different practical implementations of the security-development nexus. The third part contains reflections and thoughts about the evidence surrounding (and
changes in) the security-development nexus, and presents ideas about its future development.

2 Reflections on the security-development nexus in the contemporary literature

The security-development nexus is a policy framework that combines the need for security with striving for development (Brinkestam 2012). The major contemporary considerations about the security-development nexus are based on the assumption of the interdependence of development and security: the fact that security enables development, and that development is a prerequisite of security. Furthermore, we can also identify a dominant interpretation that underdevelopment, poverty, fragility and instability in the Global South may constitute a threat to the security of the Global North. Even though the security-development nexus is a rather widely accepted perspective today, scholars, experts and policy-makers differ about which of these (i.e. security or development) comes first, and how to tackle the problem on the ground. Scrutiny of the contemporary literature and policy documents makes it evident that there exist at least three interpretations of the relationship between security and development:

- **Security first.** This attitude originates in the idea that the existence of a secure environment is a prerequisite for development; i.e. that insecurity and a dangerous environment negatively influence economic-, political-, social- as well as human development, and reproduce poverty. Any form of development needs a safe, working environment. In other words, security is a component of governability. Representatives of this attitude include Etzioni (2007) and Dobbins (2008), and in politics the European Commission (2018) and OECD DAC (2004) – to name just a few.

- **Development first.** This attitude originates in the idea that development decreases stress and the risk of conflict. Development is a prerequisite of security, while poverty and underdevelopment are sources of insecurity and conflict, and development policy is the instrument for strengthening security. Development assistance is thus aimed not only at supporting development, but preventing conflict and violence. In other words, development is a technique of governability, and security is one of the aspects and consequences of development. Among representatives of this attitude we can identify, for example, the World Bank (2011), the European Union (2017), and scholars such as Brainard and Chollet (2007) and Collier et al. (2003).

- **Development and security go hand in hand.** This attitude does not prioritize either development or security, but understands both as interdependent. Development and security must be supported jointly and may affect each other positively as well as negatively. This approach is represented by human security advocates such as the UNDP (1994), for example, and in academia by Duffield (2001), among others.
These three interpretations are equally often present in the security-development debate and fundamentally influence the conceptualization and implementation of the security-development nexus in practice.

3 Various implementations of the security-development nexus in practice

Awareness of the security-development nexus appeared in international politics more than two decades ago and has since then been translated into numerous documents, projects and practical policies. These practical steps and activities in the field reflect the variety of understandings of the interdependence between development and security. Scrutiny of the practical implementations of the security-development nexus can provide useful hints for better understanding the different facets of the interdependence between security and development and also the potential critical points in situations when development and security are linked. In the next section the various practical implications and consequences of the security-development nexus will be introduced and scrutinized.

3.1 The emergence of stabilization and reconstruction operations

Security and development policies are interdependent, as increasingly demonstrated by the increasing awareness of the security-development nexus in a wide range of projects. Many states, policy makers, experts, bureaucrats and armed forces have been engaged in international humanitarian, reconstruction and peacebuilding missions in recent years in the form of operations undertaken in weak, underdeveloped and risky areas. The crucial moment seems to have been the international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each country that has Provincial Reconstruction Teams in each of the respective countries has to take a stance on the security-development nexus and has been challenged when debating the topics of foreign security and engagement with development at home. A number of policy makers and state representatives have agreed that “in this world it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between security interests, (our) development efforts and democratic ideals … Diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together” (Rice 2006). Experiences from the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the Solomon Islands, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have shown that military security (or generally, the establishment of security) goes hand in hand with social and economic reconstruction, democratization and good governance. All the lessons learned from post-conflict operations originate in so-called stabilization and reconstruction politics. Stabilization and reconstruction politics as a new approach have emerged in many states, including the United States, United Kingdom and Germany, but also in smaller countries with limited international engagement (e.g. the Czech Republic, which had its own Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar/Afghanistan).

What stabilization and reconstruction policy consist of, and how this policy area is connected with security and development policy, will be demonstrated and analysed using the case of the United States. The US model of stabilization and reconstruction
policy, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies, has become the model for many other countries and thus may be considered a representative case.

The United States established stabilization policy as a reaction to robust counterinsurgency interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the lessons learned from these two countries were used to build a model stabilization policy. The US model is based on a merger of diplomacy, security and development policy which was followed by institutional and organizational changes in all three policy sectors. The reform included the transformation of relations and processes of cooperation between the Department of Defense (hereafter DOD), the State Department, the National Security Council, and the US Agency for International Development (hereafter, USAID). Changes in the tasks of the US army and the emergence of a new conception of civil-military relations have been reflected in changes of the tasks of USAID, followed also by changes in the USAID budget and later by changes in the law on development assistance.

The peak of the reforms – that also demonstrated the merger of all sectors and coordination requirements – was the establishment of the post of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations in 2004, which in 2009 evolved into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (hereafter, CSO). The goal of the Bureau is “to help U.S. diplomats prevent, respond to, and recover from conflict which disrupts and undermines long-term development and capacity building … [and] brings partners and State Department capabilities together to assist, identify, and implement policy …” (CSO 2017). The Bureau works as an inter-departmental group which connects people and projects from the State Department, DOD, USAID, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Trade, and the Department of Homeland Security. People from the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations plan projects in the framework of the security-development nexus, advise when stabilization and reconstruction teams are needed and how they should be localized, and also track the situation in different parts of the world to identify potential threats to the United States and when to engage in stabilization operations.

In cooperation with the National Security Council, the Bureau has created the Inter-agency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and all departments and governmental agencies are obliged to co-operate with this institution. In order to support stabilization and reconstruction activities, a special budget for stabilization operations has been created. The budget has been managed by USAID and used to finance quick-response projects such as the operations of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency operations that include projects to win hearts and minds of local populations, and projects for training the Afghani national army.

In 2016, impact assessments of stabilization initiatives were made public and in 2018 the first ever Stabilization Assistance Review was published together by the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense. When USAID introduced the
review it stated that “stabilization includes restoring basic services such as water and electricity … in certain situations, none of [the former] can be accomplished without help from the military … DOD also helps USAID and State get into areas it would not be able to go into without additional security” (Welsh 2018). As is evident from the information above, DOD, the State Department and USAID have been the key players by concurrently DOD participating in civilian and development projects, and USAID in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

The connection of security and development in stabilization and reconstruction policy has influenced the work and organizational structure of USAID and the US Army. Under stabilization and reconstruction operations the intensity of civil-military cooperation has increased (e.g. joint action with USAID or cooperation with non-governmental organizations that are implementing USAID projects) and new military training which has enabled the integration of civilians into military structures was introduced. The US Army received the new task of participating in critical infrastructure building, supporting good governance, elections, free media, and the rule of law and security sector reform. The growing number of stabilization and reconstruction operations and the lessons thereby learned have also been reflected in strategic documents. In particular, the National Defense Strategy of 2005 explicitly speaks about the importance of civil-military cooperation in the fight against the enemy. Civil-military cooperation has become the cornerstone of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations of the US Army.

Not only has the US Army been transformed, but profound changes have been made to the organizational and institutional structure of USAID and the relationship between USAID, the US Army and other governmental departments. Within USAID, an Office of Civil-Military Cooperation was established and USAID officers now sit in US unified combatant commands planning and coordinating cooperation between DOD and USAID. These changes have been framed by the National Security Strategy 2002, in which development is thought of as one of three pillars of US national security. Consequently, USAID issued the report *Foreign Aid in the National Interest. Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*. The report declared development assistance to be a strategic instrument of US foreign policy which facilitates the maintainance of US national security and international peace (USAID 2002). The changes have also affected the system of cooperation with third parties, and of grant giving. USAID, based on the Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive\(^\text{20}\) (also called Anti-Terrorism Certification), primarily prefers to collaborate with and to support organizations and states that fight against terrorism (Moss *et al.* 2005).

To sum up, there presently exist collaborative relations in the triangle of organizations the State Department, USAID and DOD; moreover, there also exists close cooperation between the US Army and USAID framed as civil-military operations. The US Army and USAID carry out local development projects with the aim of assisting local communities
to establish good and transparent governance and build relations between the population and political representatives, and to win the hearts and minds of local people; i.e. to decrease support for insurgence and related economic activity. In implementing local development projects, USAID needs military assistance to protect civilian employees, and the US Army hopes to use USAID’s projects, money and expertise as part of a complex counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategy.

3.2 The pooling of resources and the use of development budgets for security goals

As indicated in the case of the United States, the security-development nexus has affected not only the organizational and institutional structure of the branch of development and security, but has also had a deep impact on budgeting. This transformation in budgeting has been called the “pooling of resources”. It includes the merging of budgets into one “bag” and using development – traditionally civilian – budgets for security and military purposes, typically in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The pooling of resources takes place not only in the US but has also occurred in Canada, Great Britain and in the Czech Republic, to name just a few examples (DFAIT\(^{21}\) 2006; DFID\(^{22}\), FCO\(^{23}\) and MOD\(^{24}\) 2003). The pioneer of the pooling of resources based on the security-development nexus was actually Canada. The first integrated Canadian budget was introduced in 1991 and called the International Assistance Envelope. This budget merged all development projects and resources of all governmental agencies with the aim of improving human security. During that time, human security was Ottawa’s key foreign policy goal (Waisová 2009). The construction of the integrated development budget continued even when Canada abandoned a human-security-focused policy. The basis for the further pooling of resources was the need to meet the demands of the OECD Development Assistance Committee concerning the effective use of resources and to implement a so-called “whole-of-government approach” (CIDA\(^{25}\) 2007, 2008 and 2009).

For our analysis, it is important to trace and evaluate the security-development nexus as a framework for pooling resources. In the case of Canada, the main transformations may be observed in the development budget after Canada became engaged in Afghanistan. Since Fiscal Year 2004–2005 the ministry of defense has been the first governmental body with permission to use funds from the Integrated Assistance Envelope, and since then initiatives such as Disaster Assistance Response Teams, provincial reconstruction teams, rapid response teams, stabilization and reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have been covered from it (CIDA 2007, 2008 and 2009). Since 2006 the Global Peace and Security Fund, a part of the Integrated Assistance Envelope, has been working to collect financial resources for operations in weak and failing states where the Department of Defense does not have a presence, and which are not beneficiaries of Canadian development assistance. This fund is managed by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force and is used to finance –

Not only in Canada has the pooling of resources – particularly the use of development budgets for security and military purposes, and the opening up of development budgets for the armed forces – become the norm rather than the exception. As will be demonstrated and analysed below, the door for such transformations was clearly opened by OECD DAC when it changed the definition and guidelines of development assistance in 2007.

4 The new security role of international financial institutions

The security-development nexus has not only had an impact on foreign policy and domestic policymaking. The linking of security with development – or rather insecurity with underdevelopment – occurred within the United Nations, as well as on the agendas of international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank. While the UN is and always was the primary body with security issues on its agenda, the World Bank has always been the first and foremost financial body. In the World Bank’s documents, development has traditionally been defined in socioeconomic terms and security issues have tended to be ignored. The condition for countries to receive World Bank assistance was that there should be no war and violence in the country. However, since the beginning of the 1990s World Bank policy has started to change, and issues such as governance and the impact of development projects on the security situation have risen on its agenda.

The decisive moment was the Middle East Peace Process and war in Former Yugoslavia. Based on the Oslo Peace Accords, the World Bank administered financial resources for the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip and of the West Bank. When war in Former Yugoslavia erupted, the European Commission asked the World Bank to participate in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1995, the Bank led a joint mission (with the IMF, the European Commission and USAID) to finally meet the reconstruction needs of Bosnia, while later it managed the Trust Fund for the country. In both cases, the bank found itself in an unusual position; it developed special relations on the ground, received excellent information about the situation, and was challenged by security and post-conflict issues (Schiavo-Campo 2003).

In the 1990s, the number of conflict or post-conflict countries where the Bank had projects increased (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, Croatia and Cambodia, to name a few) (Holtzman et al. 1998). These experiences profoundly changed the Bank’s role in security issues and led to transformation of the Bank’s agenda. Institutional changes such as the establishment of the special Post-Conflict Unit, of the Framework for World Bank Re-engagement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and a special fund for post-conflict
countries were introduced. The Bank’s resources were used to finance the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, demining and the rehabilitation of community life, to name a few initiatives (Van Houten 2007).

At the beginning of 2001, the Bank accepted an operational policy called “Development cooperation and conflict” as the guiding principle for future programs. The basic idea embedded in this policy was that underdevelopment may be a source of insecurity and conflict, and that via development assistance peace and security may be supported. Consequently, the post-conflict reconstruction unit was expanded with a bigger budget and greater human capacities and awarded a mandate to participate in conflict prevention and resolution (Bannon 2005). The Bank started to engage with countries which were not eligible to receive standard development assistance because they were undergoing conflict. Significant impact on the change in the Banks’ motivation for development assistance and also in the implementation of development projects originated in the findings of the World Bank’s research team led by P. Collier. Collier and his colleagues formulated the concept of the so-called “conflict trap”. This term describes the pattern of repeating civil wars; Collier and his team also assumed that civil wars are associated with economic problems and mistakes in development policy, and when such mistakes are eliminated and problems solved, a path out of the conflict trap may emerge (Collier et al. 2003).

A milestone in the acceptance of the security-development nexus was the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the consequent World Bank engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bank’s representatives argued that it is not poverty that leads to terrorism, but rather weak governance and failing state institutions that create a haven for terrorists (Bannon 2005). By the end of 2001, the Bank had created so-called LICUS initiative (Low Income Countries Under Stress) and framed the initiative with the motto “[the] eradication of poverty is the way to global security” (Bourguignon 2005). In 2004, LICUS was awarded a special budget, not for classical development assistance, but to finance project-supporting good governance, the rule of law, social services and peacebuilding, including security sector reform and the demobilization of soldiers.

The symbolical peak of the security-development nexus transformations in World Bank’s agenda was the annual report from 2011 entitled “Conflict, Security, and Development”. The Report concludes that 90 per cent of the civil wars which have started since the end of the 1990s have emerged in countries with previous experience with civil war or violence (the conflict trap) and the biggest challenges for development are avoiding this conflict trap and new forms of violence such as insurgency and civil wars. The first step in fostering development is the provision of security – without security there can be no development, but security can hardly be improved without development, which is why development projects also need to be implemented in countries in conflict (World Bank 2011, 2, 5 and 41). The report declares that it is necessary “to apply security-development linkages in all areas struggling to prevent large-scale political or criminal violence”
The subsequent World Bank projects respected the trend created by the 2011 Bank report.

To sum up, the penetration of the security-development nexus into politics and on the agendas of international bodies has gone global, and even organizations with no security goals on their agendas have accepted it as the basic framework for their projects. How far the security-development nexus has changed international financial institutions is clearly demonstrated in the case of the World Bank. In less than one decade, the Bank became an important and qualified partner of the UN, NATO, the EU and several states in conflict-affected and post-conflict areas using development assistance and particularly local development projects to prevent violence and to bridge the conflict trap. In several conflict-affected areas it would hardly be possible to engage in reconstruction and to build a peaceful working domestic system without the World Bank’s engagement (Schiavo-Campo 2003).

4.1 A new definition of development assistance

As indicated above, the implementation of the idea of the security-development nexus has brought about the transformation of security policy, as well as of development assistance. The cases of the World Bank, Canada, and the United States also demonstrate the fact that donors have profoundly changed their approaches over the last two decades. While shortly after the end of the Cold War the criteria for receiving development assistance was poverty or humanitarian need and the absence of violent conflict, at the beginning of the new millennium the biggest donors were stressing the need to use development assistance for various security purposes, while a situation of peace in the country was not required (Brzoska 2008). These developments even caused several representatives of the least developed countries to become skeptical; they complained that to qualify for development assistance or international loans their countries had to be undergoing violence. In other words, the international post-9/11 discourse led to a disadvantage for poor but peaceful countries, because the chance of countries in conflict receiving assistance was much greater (World Bank 2011). These transformations were not only reflected in projects on the ground, but started to be reflected in the basic framework that regulated the provision of development assistance.

The key role in the transformation of the framework regulating development assistance was played by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the body that gathers together the biggest donors. The DAC member countries have been debating the security-development nexus since the middle of the 1990s when human security entered international politics as an issue. Human security was discussed as the possible framework for the Millennium Development Goals, and the future guiding principle for DAC activities (OECD 1997, 2001 and 2004). Although the concept of human security did not become the final principle of development assistance, the debate made it clear that DAC accepted the claim to a link between development and security.
The debate involving the security-development nexus in development assistance principles continued in the post-9/11 period when several big donors were operating provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan and wanted to use development budgets for their activities. The DAC member countries articulated that the big problem was weak and failing states. While in the 1990s weak and failing states were understood as a problem for their citizens and as a barrier to local development, in the post-9/11 period weak and failing states were considered to be a haven for terrorists and insurgents, and as a threat to international security (Duffield 2006; Brzoska 2008). Consequently, within DAC security was interpreted as a prerequisite for development (OECD 2004).

Changes in understanding development and development assistance were completed in 2007 when a new directive defining what could be financed from the development budget (i.e. what may be understood as development assistance) was issued by OECD DAC. Since 2007, budgets for development assistance may be used, for example, for the management of security expenditure, for an increase in the role of civil society in the democratic control of military forces, for assistance to child soldiers, for security sector reform, for demining and also for the activities of provincial reconstruction teams (OECD 2007) (Box 1).

Box 1: Official Development Assistance Reporting Rules – what donors may report as development assistance

| Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control ... Participation in the post-conflict peace-building phase of United Nations peace operations (activities such as human rights and elections monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers, rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure, monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces, training in customs and border control procedures, advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy, repatriation and demobilization of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; support for landmine removal) ... Reintegration of demobilized military personnel into the economy; conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. |


The changes in development assistance principles and guidelines and budgeting clearly demonstrate the penetration of the security-development nexus into policy-making frameworks, norms and rules. Consequently, they have led to the spread of the security-development nexus within DAC member states, and also beyond. Reflections about the security-development nexus on the formal, normative level indicate that the changes have not been ad hoc, short term and situation specific, but rather deep, based on long-term political interests and the consensus of the biggest donors.
4.2 Armies as agents of development

Armed forces have usually been not the agents of development assistance, but the participation of militaries in development projects is not entirely new. In several countries (Sri Lanka, Nepal, India and Ghana) military forces have traditionally been vehicles for development and innovation diffusion at home. Armed forces may build infrastructure, offer education and health care, and transfer skills and knowledge. However, use of the army as an agent of development is rather uncommon at the international level.

One of the first experiences of military forces as agents of development assistance entered world politics in the 1990s. Several international peace operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone to name a few) undertook local humanitarian and development activities and assisted when local development projects were created. Soldiers engaged in UN operations participated in the building of hospitals, demining, demobilization, and the social reintegration of former combatants, the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and healthcare systems, etc. However, the milestone was international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Duffield (2006, 30) comments:

... during the 1990s, the military doctrine among leading states was to support civilian humanitarian agencies and to only become directly involved in humanitarian activities as a last resort. Since Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan, this situation has changed. Humanitarian assistance ... has increasingly been colored by political considerations. In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, humanitarian assistance, development and social reconstruction have been redrafted as a legitimating support for transitional state entities and their transformation into show-case examples of regional stability. This places tremendous responsibilities upon cooperating aid agencies and draws them directly into an ex-posed political process. At the same time, due to widespread insecurity and insurgency violence, the military has moved beyond protection and become directly involved in activities it labels as ‘humanitarian’.

The developmental role of the military forces was for many military representatives very new and in many cases the military structures did not have time to prepare for it; when international forces came to Iraq and Afghanistan, local bureaucrats and policy makers from ministries disappeared overnight (Interview with Petr Voznica,29 20 May, 2011, Ljubljana/Slovenia) and international forces, wanting to maintain the operation of state structures and a minimal rule of law, had to at least temporarily carry out civilian tasks. In several cases international forces were the only actors with the human resources, skills and infrastructure to deliver social services, including transferring money (salaries for civil servants) into remote areas (Box 2).
Box 2: The US Army’s tasks in Afghanistan

KUNAR PROVINCE, Afghanistan, September 22, 2011 Approximately 60 Soldiers from across Illinois, as well as two Soldiers from Michigan and South Dakota respectively, have been deployed to Kunar province since June with the Illinois Army National Guard’s 1–14th Agribusiness Development Team.

The Agribusiness Development Team, or ADT ... have been assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in revitalizing and establishing a strong, growing and sustainable agriculture industry.

The Illinois team’s mission is part of a broad effort that involves multiple National Guard ADTs from several states, each operating within its own province. The teams typically come from mid-western states, such as Missouri, Nebraska, Indiana and Iowa, which are known for agriculture production ... The Illinois soldiers have educations and backgrounds in agronomy, plant and soil science, forestry, engineering, pest management, zoology and hydrology ... All this expertise is critical for ADTs to operate in a country where the agricultural sector has suffered setbacks in the form of a Soviet military occupation, a civil war and devastating droughts over the past 30 years. While training is one key element of the ADT mission, the team also promotes sustainability by providing aid to Afghan entrepreneurs who wish to start or expand agribusinesses that have a positive impact on the local economy.


The change in the role and activities that military forces have experienced during the last two decades have resulted in transformations at the strategic, organizational, and conceptual level; strategic military documents have been penetrated by the security-development nexus, civil-military units and civil-military rapid response teams have been created, and several armies (the US and Canadian Army, to name a few) have adopted a three-block model of war which seeks to combine the delivery of humanitarian aid with peace support operations and high-intensity fighting (Dorn and Varey 2008).

Changes in military operations and tasks have not been without criticism. The local development engagement of armed forces has been criticized because soldiers may not be trained for such activities, or as a waste of military money and capacity. Proponents of the developmental engagement of armed forces have argued that when the military is the only agent that is able to support local development projects, then it has to do it, and when support for local development seems to be the way to win the hearts and minds of the local population and to decrease support for insurgent and terrorist groups, it is also necessary to pursue this option. Irrespective of the position, the transformation of the role of the military forces according to the security-development nexus is the reality in many countries today.
The security-development nexus: conclusions

Development and security, underdevelopment, poverty and insecurity, security policy and development assistance – all these topics were traditionally understood as independent areas of issues. Similarly, the actors engaged in development assistance and in security policies were rarely linked. Development agencies and humanitarian/development non-governmental organizations supported education, health care, or construction-based infrastructure projects such as dams, irrigation systems or rails and roads. Armed forces trained for military operations, defended countries, or fought in wars.

The situation has changed since the beginning of the 1990s, and security as well as development experts have accentuated the links and relations between security and development. A focus on the security-development nexus is no exception today; it is rather part of the mainstream in terms of security as well as development studies. However, there are variety of interpretations of the nature of the interdependence between development and security, or underdevelopment, poverty and insecurities respectively: different actors use different approaches and interpretations which consequently influence the penetration of the security-development nexus into politics and its implementation on the ground. As demonstrated and analysed above, there are at least three approaches to the security-development nexus: “security first,” “development first,” and “security and development hand in hand”.

All three approaches have found their application in practice and have led to profound changes in the military, as well as in development strategies and practice at the national as well as international level, and have deeply influenced the institutional, organizational and managerial background of security as well as development assistance. As is evident from the data and information presented above, there are some trends in the application of the security-development nexus. While a few decades ago countries in conflict did not meet the criteria for development assistance, today violence and conflict may even contribute to the fact that states qualify for development assistance. Development assistance, particularly local development projects, are not only tools for supporting local communities, but are used as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tools. In other words, local development projects have turned into components of security strategy.

Last but not least, security and development assistance agents have also experienced these profound changes and transformations. Development agencies and bodies work in insecure and conflict-ridden areas in cooperation with military forces, while military forces carry out civilian tasks that were traditionally outside their area of responsibility. All the evidence and changes indicate that the security-development nexus has became the norm rather than the exception, and is now the approach for managing global challenges and local insecurities. In all probability, the next decade will not bring any
revolutions in the security-development nexus, nor a divorce between security and development.

Notes:
1 The Dahla Dam is the second largest in Afghanistan, built in 1952 on the Arghandab River. It was rehabilitated between 2008 and 2012 with assistance provided by the Government of Canada.
2 CIDA does not exist anymore as an independent body. In 2013, the government of S. Harper decided to incorporate the independent agency into the ministry of foreign affairs, arguing that this was necessary to improve the coordination and efficiency of Canadian foreign policy. CIDA was also renamed – today it is the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.
3 GoC: Government of Canada.
4 The Brandt Report was written by the Independent Commission, first chaired by Willy Brandt (the former German Chancellor) in 1980, as a review of international development issues.
5 UN Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The aforementioned report was published in 1982.
6 UN: United Nations.
8 International Monetary Fund.
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
10 European Union.
11 9/11: The September 11 attacks (also referred to as 9/11) were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001.
12 A panel discussion held on April 20, 2018 at the World Bank Group Headquarters about the relationship between security and development and enhancing collaboration across the humanitarian, development, peace and security sectors to deliver more efficiently and effectively in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Participants: World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim, General John Allen (Ret.), President of the Brookings Institution, and a panel of high-level guests.
13 The “Global South” is a term that has been emerging in transnational and postcolonial studies to refer to what may also be called the "Developing World" (i.e., Africa, Latin America, and developing countries in Asia), or "developing countries," "less developed countries," and "less developed regions".
14 The North–South divide is broadly considered to be a socioeconomic and political divide. Generally, definitions of the Global North include the United States, Canada, Europe, developed parts of Asia (the Four Asian Tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) as well as Australia and New Zealand.
15 The OECD Development Assistance Committee became part of the OECD following Ministerial Resolution on 23 July 1961. It is a unique international forum of many of the largest donors of aid, including 30 DAC Members. The Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank participate as observers.
16 The United States Department of State (DOS), often referred to as the State Department, is the United States’ federal executive department. This body has the role of advising the president and represents the country in international affairs and foreign policy issues. It is equivalent to the foreign ministry of other countries.
17 The Department of Defense (DoD, USDOD, or DOD) is an executive branch department of the federal government of the United States charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies
and functions of the government concerned directly with national security and the United States Armed Forces.

18 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance.

19 The review is available from the website of the US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283334.htm (15 March, 2019).

20 Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive (AAPD) issued by USAID on September 24, 2004. Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing. Implementing Executive Order 13224. Accordingly, entities associated with terrorism are not eligible to funding from USAID.

21 DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada).

22 DFID: Department for International Development (UK).

23 FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK).

24 MoD: Ministry of Defence (UK).

25 CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency.

26 GPSF: Global Peace and Security Fund (Canada).

27 OECD DAC: OECD Development Assistance Committee.

28 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance of 29 (North American and European) countries.


30 Available at: https://www.army.mil/article/66004/agribusiness_soldiers_focused_on_afghanistan_mission (15 March, 2019)

References:


